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SUMMARY 
 
One of the issues within the network approach to policy concerns the influence of the network 
structure on the policy processes that are taking place within it. A central point is the concept of 
rules. The basic assumption is that actors in networks form communal rules during their 
interactions. This article shows the way in which these network rules influence the policy 
processes. First, the rules of two local social housing networks are reconstructed. We then show 
how these rules differ, for example in terms of rules for conflict regulation and autonomy, 
between the two networks and how they influenced the decision-making surrounding the 
rehabilitation and restructuring of post-war housing districts that took place within these 
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networks. We look at the extent to which these differences in the rule structures of the networks 
explain the differences in the development of the decision-making processes. The article 
concludes with a discussion of rules as a context for decision making.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Within public administration a good deal of attention has recently been devoted to institutions 
and institutional explanations. After a long period in which policy processes were viewed 
primarily as resulting from more or less goal-oriented decisions and in which the analytical 
emphasis lay mainly on actors' goal-oriented strategies (see March/Olson, 1989) the institutional 
dimension of administrative behavior and administrative processes has once more taken center 
stage (Scharpf, 1997; also Scott, 1995). One of the developments which fits into this turnaround 
is the attention devoted to governance in networks (Marsh/Rhodes, 1992; O ‘Toole, 1997; 
Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997).   
The network perspective assumes that policy is developed and implemented in networks in 
organizations. These policy networks can be defined as ‘changing patterns of social relationships 
between interdependent actors which take shape around policy problems and/or clusters of 
resources and that are formed, maintained and changed by an ecology of games between these 
actors’ (Klijn, 1996a: 97; see also Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997). Within these policy networks 
actors conduct themselves strategically in policy processes. In this theoretical framework, policy 
processes are viewed as (series of) games (for the concept of game, see Allison, 1971; 
Crozier/Friedberg, 1980; Scharpf, 1997). The multiplicity of actors and their various and 
sometimes conflicting perceptions, interests and strategies make these games complex (see Klijn, 
1996a, also Cohen/March/Olsen, 1972, Lindblom/Cohen, 1979). 
Networks come into being and remain in existence because actors are dependent on each other 
(Aldrich, 1979; Negandhi, 1975; Wamsley, 1985). Actors cannot achieve their objectives 
without resources, which are in the possession of other actors. Networks are thus characterized 
by a limited substitutability of resources, which ensures that sustainable social relations between 
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actors are created. In separate policy games actors endeavor, within the constraints of their 
dependencies and the context of the game, to achieve interesting objectives.  
Thus the network perspective stresses the importance of both stability and complexity: the 
stability of long-term social relations, and the complexity that results from the interaction of 
different perceptions and strategies of various interdependent actors. Usually in empirical 
analysis it is only complexity that is elaborated. Empirical research is directed at the patterns of 
interaction, the strategies of the actors or their different perceptions, frameworks or theories in 
use. The aspect of stability, of shared rules between actors in networks, is rarely the object of 
empirical research. One reason for this is that it is very time consuming to analyze more than just 
formalized written rules. If one assumes that rules are being created by the actors themselves in 
interaction, then the researcher has to do the work of reconstructing the rules from what the 
actors say and do. 
The question of what rules regulate the behavior of actors in networks, how these rules change 
and how they affect the interactions within networks are both interesting and relevant. In this 
article an attempt is made to analyze the rules of networks and their impact on interaction and 
decision making. For this analysis two local housing networks in the Netherlands, one in 
Rotterdam and the other in The Hague, are compared. An analysis is made of the rules and of the 
decision-making processes at work in these two networks for the rehabilitation of post-war 
housing and the restructuring of post-war housing districts. 
Section 2 states first the theoretical framework that was used for the study and ends with an 
explanation of how the research was carried out. Section 3 describes the context of the study: the 
Dutch housing system and the policy-making process for rehabilitating post-war housing. This 
section also gives a very brief description of the policy-making processes in the two cities and 
the main differences between them. Then in sections 4 and 5 an analysis is made of the rules that 
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are operating in the two local housing networks. The relationship between the two sets of rules 
and the outcomes of the interaction patterns are elaborated. The article ends with some 
conclusions on the effects of network rules on interactions and tries to summarize some 
promising directions for future research. 
 
 
2. NETWORK RULES AND DECISION MAKING: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Through their sustained interactions, actors create network structures: rules and resources that 
(will) have a structuring effect on future interactions in the network. The original inspiration for 
the structure concept and how it relates to interactions comes from the English sociologist 
Anthony Giddens (1979; 1984). Giddens summarizes the distinctive relationship between 
structure and interaction in his term ‘duality of structures’. Structure is a precondition for action, 
and at the same time it is affirmed and changed during that action. We can use a linguistic 
example to illustrate what Giddens means by this duality of structures. We use grammatical rules 
to create practical language: speaking and writing. Without these rules communication would be 
impossible. At the same time, however, grammatical rules change during everyday use. Styles of 
speaking and writing become obsolete and are replaced by others. New spelling rules are 
developed which might be formally initiated or may simply be a codification of rules that have 
been in informal use for some time. The process of institutionalization in which rules are formed 
and changed is a continuous, ongoing process (Berger/Luckman, 1966; Zijderveld, 1974). Game 
rules regulate actors' behavior without determining it. Outcomes of the game are determined by 
the interaction of the participating actors' strategies. The statement that rules regulate actors' 
behavior in a game needs further analysis. Rules are not natural laws and actors are not pawns in 
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a game with no will of their own.  
 
Characteristics of rule-guided behavior 
Rules can be described as generalizable procedures that are adopted in the production and 
reproduction of games (freely rendered from Giddens, 1984: 18-21). One might characterize 
them as algorithms that provide social actors with a handle to determine the correct line of 
behavior. It will become clear that this description is too formalistic and too rigid. Rules can be 
formally laid down or have a more informal, tacit character. Although both are important, in this 
article the emphasis will lie on the informal rules.1 In this analysis the cognitive aspects of rules 
are underlined. The main emphasis will lie on the basic assumption that rules structure meanings 
and create cognitive frames through which reality is viewed.2  
Rules are learned during participation in the game but are at the same time never entirely 
unambiguously present. They are only partly codified. Rules relate to the accepted and possible 
margins of action. They offer scope for action and at the same time delimit it. But what does it 
actually mean: actors follow rules? In other words: what are the features of rule-guided behavior 
(Klijn, 1996)?3  
 
Rules structure social practices 
Without rules, in the sense of generalizable procedures that regulate action, games would not be 
possible because the players would have no shared meanings at their disposal to enable 
interaction. Rules thus offer a framework within which concrete interactions can take place and 
can be interpreted; rules structure social practices. That does not mean, however, that certain 
social practices are guided by only one rule (Giddens, 1984). Social practices are usually 
underpinned by a series of overlapping rules. In analysing the rules in games, attention focuses 
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on specific, generalizable procedures in those practices. 
 
Rules need ‘followers’ 
Rules assume a regularity but not a pattern. There is an essential difference between the two and 
this is linked to the fundamental difference between social and physical rules. It refers to the fact 
that rules must have followers and can only be maintained by the will of the actors. Rules as such 
can also be criticized and changed. They only continue to exist if they are continually 
(re)affirmed by actors either overtly or tacitly. Disobeying the rules can be followed by a whole 
range of possible sanctions.  
As March and Olsen show, rules display a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 
23-24). This involves interpreting the situations in which players find themselves and translating 
this interpretation into action based on the appropriate rules. Applying rules to specific situations 
is usually uncertain and requires interpretation. This interpretation contains an important source 
of conflicts about and changes to rules (March/Olsen, 1989; Weick, 1979). The following of 
rules and their continued existence thus does not take place ‘behind actors' backs’ but is a 
consequence of the actions of actors who use rules as an interpretative framework for those 
actions.4  
 
Rules relate to actors' competence. 
Rule-guided behavior means that actors have implicit knowledge about how to act in particular 
situations. As Duintjer (1977: 27) states, understanding the art of following the correct rules of 
behavior in a particular situation is a practical skill. Such implicit knowledge is acquired by 
actors during socialization processes (Burns/Flam, 1987). Rules are very important to routine 
processes, for example. Various actors emphasize the enormous amount of knowledge which is 
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needed to carry out routine actions but also the enormous number of rules which regulate such 
routine actions (Giddens, 1984: 22; Morgan, 1986: 130). In many cases this knowledge and the 
rules used remain implicit. Explaining the rules often involves an interpretation of those rules 
and can also change the use of rules. 
 
Rules are trans-situational and not actor-bound 
Rules bear upon the relationships between actors. They regulate the interactions between actors 
and are thus by definition neither actor-bound nor specific to one situation. Rules thus relate to 
repeated behaviors of actors in different situations and are also valid over a longer period in a 
particular social context. Cohen (1989: 43) states in this regard, ‘Rules of conduct are trans-
situational, in the sense that they are involved in forms of conduct that are (I) reproduced and 
recognized many times over during the routine activities undertaken by members of a 
collectivity, and (II) reproduced and recognized for a considerable period in the history of that 
group, (...) - rules of conduct may be conceived as trans-situational properties of a collectivity 
that enter into the reproduction of institutionalized conduct.’ Rule-guided behavior entails 
participating in joint social practices (Duintjer, 1977). Rules are characteristic of the network or 
of part of it. They are created and remain in existence because actors maintain shared practices. 
Actors feel safe in a situation because they share the same rules in that particular situation. This 
means that in order to follow rules actors must be part of a ‘collective community’, however 
loosely organized it may be. 
 
Rules and actions: a complex relationship 
Because, as has been said, social practices within games are nearly always regulated by 
overlapping sets of rules, and that, in addition, rules are often abstract and ambiguous, the 
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players have to constantly transpose the rules as they know them into the concrete situation. It is 
not always clear which rules apply in a specific situation and how they should be applied in a 
particular case. Application and interpretation of rules can thus cause shifts and changes in the 
network's set of rules. Furthermore, rules can be consciously broken. The fact that rules need to 
gain a following means that they must be supported by the actors within the network.  
In this way there is a continuous interplay between the rules, i.e. the structure of the network, and 
the games in which the rules are used. It will be clear that in a ‘normal, routine situation’ only a 
small portion of the rule pattern of the network is explicitly under discussion. Interaction 
between actors would be very time consuming and laborious if all the previously made rules had 
to be reconfirmed in every single new game. A large part of the network structure will therefore 
be ‘taken for granted’ and will not be under discussion (see, e.g., Duintjer, 1977; March/Olson, 
1989; Scott, 1995). For various reasons, only a small section of the rules comes ‘under pressure’ 
in any one game. This ensures a certain continuity in the network. Since rules are trans-
situational and not actor-bound they have to be supported by a number of actors. This is another 
reason why it is unlikely that rules will change at the drop of a hat: all the actors would have to 
decide simultaneously that particular rules were no longer relevant to their actions. Furthermore, 
rules are often embedded in a whole set of interconnected rules, which makes them less prone to 
rapid change. Rules thus ensure a certain stability in actors' behavior, without determining that 
behavior or its outcomes. One could also say that rules enable actors to assume a particular 
behavior on the part of other actors without this having to be tested in a concrete case each time. 
Rules reduce uncertainty about the behavior of other actors but cannot ever remove it 
completely; after all, actors are not factors. 
 
Types of rules in networks 
  
 
 10
An analysis of network rules is certainly relevant to gaining an insight into policy processes. The 
question is, however, what should the analysis concentrate on, in other words which rules or 
types of rules might be important to an analysis of policy networks. For an analysis of rules it is 
necessary to determine what types of rules the researcher is looking for. In the research into the 
rehabilitation and restructuring of post-war housing districts, use is made of a typology that 
distinguishes between interaction rules and arena rules. 
The two types of rules have their own distinctive features. Arena rules provide the actors with a 
handle in determining the nature of the game and network in which they find themselves. These 
rules define a particular practice. Duintjer (1977) argues that this type of rule is often not 
recognized as a rule because it is ‘taken for granted’ (Duintjer, 1977: 46). Interaction rules, on 
the other hand, clearly have a procedural character that tells actors what is and is not permitted 
within the network. They modify behavior within the arena rules.5 In both types of rules a 
number of aspects are distinguished – they could be termed subsets of rules – that have had 
special attention devoted to them in the research (see Klijn, 1996: 64-66). In distinguishing these 
subsets a correlation is sought with existing classifications (see especially Ostrom, 1986; 
Burns/Flam, 1987). 
In the arena rules three subsets are distinguished. These are: 
- rules that specify what is relevant and what is not for the actors involved in the network 
in which they are operating (reality rules).  In other words, they furnish the actors with a 
sort of policy paradigm (Benson, 1982). Within this subset two types of rule are chiefly 
examined: rules concerning the identity of actors (identity rules) and professional 
standards that exist within a network about products and services that are provided 
(product rules). For example, in the non-profit housing sector clear, professionally shared 
standards regarding the quality of a dwelling are distinguished; 
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- rules that specify rewards for behavior (reward rules). These rules regulate which 
advantages and disadvantages are linked to particular game interactions. This might 
include formalized rules (e.g. subsidy rules) but also more informal rules in which status 
and evaluation criteria of outcomes are regulated. 
- rules that specify the positions of actors in the network (position rules). Again, this 
involves not only formal rules but also more informal rules that specify the status of 
actors. Position rules are closely linked with the power of actors in networks. 
 
In the interaction rules two subsets of rules are distinguished: 
- rules that regulate access to playing in the network (entry rules). Entry rules regulate, for 
example, how exclusive a particular game will be (do all actors from the network have 
access or not) and how actors for a particular game are selected. This category of rules is 
closely connected with the position rules. They are frequently a refinement and extension 
of these rules; 
- rules that regulate the mode of interaction between actors (interaction rules). A non-
intervention rule is an obvious example of such a rule. Rules that regulate the provision 
of information or the method of regulating conflict management are other, though less 
obvious, examples of interaction rules. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the subsets of rules mentioned above (see Klijn, 1996). 
 
 
 TABLE 1 A TYPOLOGY OF RULES 
 Description Aspects Examples 
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Interaction rules Rules that regulate the game 
interactions; 
i.e. rules that specify what is 
and is not permitted in 
games between actors 
Entry to policy game 
 (entry rules) 
-exclusivity 
-selection 
-exit options 
  Interaction in policy game 
 (interaction rules) 
-(non)intervention 
-provision of information 
-conflict 
Arena rules Rules that regulate the game 
setting; 
rules that define the social 
practices and distinguish 
important matters from 
unimportant ones. 
Reality 
(reality rules) 
-identity of actors (identity 
rules) 
-product rules 
  Reward 
(reward rules) 
-status 
-evaluation criteria 
  Positions 
(position rules) 
-status 
-powers 
 source: Klijn, 1996 
 
 
The study: rules and decisions in post-war housing policy 
In the following sections the decision-making processes concerning the restructuring of post-war 
housing districts and the rules of the Rotterdam and Hague social housing networks are briefly 
analyzed using the typology in Table 1.  This analysis is part of a larger study on the influence of 
network rules on complex interaction processes in networks that was conducted in the period 
1991-1996 (Klijn, 1996). In the present study the rules of three housing networks have been 
reconstructed. In addition, the study consisted of a quantitative analysis of interaction patterns in 
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the three local housing networks and a reconstruction of the decision-making processes 
concerning the post-war housing districts in these networks in the period 1985-1995 (in this 
article only parts of the decision-making processes are described and analyzed). Questionnaires 
were used to gather the quantitative research on interaction patterns, and qualitative interviews 
were conducted in order to reconstruct the rules. Because of limited space only two cases and 
only a limited part of the quantitative findings are presented. An extensive theoretical elaboration 
on networks, rules and network management is presented elsewhere (see Klijn, 1996a; 
Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan (eds.), 1997). This article focuses on the question: which rules are 
important in local housing networks in the Netherlands and how do they affect policy 
interactions concerning restructuring post-war housing districts in these networks? The emphasis 
is on reconstructing the network rules and analyzing their impact on decision making. The policy 
interactions are analyzed briefly. All the quotes used in the article are taken from the interviews 
conducted for the study. 
 
 
3. THE CONTEXT: DUTCH HOUSING POLICY AND THE POST-WAR HOUSING 
PROBLEM 
 
Dutch housing policy has a long history. Over many years it has exerted a strong influence on the 
content and interaction patterns of local housing policy and on the development of network rules. 
In this section a very brief explanation of Dutch housing policy is presented along with the 
policy problems concerning post-war housing. This is followed by a brief discussion of the local 
housing networks in Rotterdam and The Hague and the key interactions around the restructuring 
of two post-war housing districts in these cities.  The housing networks are analyzed by 
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‘mapping’ the actors involved. 
 
The context of the study: the Dutch social housing system 
After the Second World War the central government played an important role in the Dutch 
housing system, for example by actively pursuing a policy to keep rents low. In the early post-
war years wages needed to be kept down in order to build up a strong export industry and this led 
to rents falling below cost price. Subsidies (known as ‘object subsidies’) were introduced to 
guarantee the construction of new dwellings. There was a need for both a large number of units 
as well as keeping them relatively cheap. The population increased sharply after the war but the 
demands of rebuilding the industrial base meant that nobody could afford much luxury.  Because 
of this, the post-war housing policy relied strongly on the development of a broad non-profit 
rental sector. In the Netherlands this is referred to as social housing and it has exerted a strong 
influence on the Dutch housing market.  The sector grew from just over 10% of the housing 
stock immediately after the war to more than 40% in the 1990s. Home ownership has only been 
promoted in recent years, increasing from just over 25% after the war to 50% at the end of the 
nineties, due to strong economic growth in the seventies and the period from the late eighties to 
the end of the century.  
The construction and management of social housing was in the hands of housing associations, 
non-profit-making bodies that are authorized by the central government but manage their 
dwellings independently. It is these organizations that own the lion's share of the dwellings 
dating from the period 1945-1960, a result of the post-war housing policy that relied so heavily 
on subsidized building in the non-profit sector.  
The commercial rental sector did not build much in the period 1945-1970. Only in the seventies 
did they start to build a large number of dwellings. This stopped again at the end of the seventies 
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when house prices went down along with the rest of the economy, and picked up again at the end 
of the eighties. 
Since the late eighties and early nineties the (social) housing system has changed drastically. 
Object subsidies have been largely phased out and the central government is now far less 
involved. Housing associations have become more independent, less tied to both government 
regulations and government subsidies.  
At the local level, where social housing policy is implemented, municipalities play an important 
role. In addition to programming and initiating new housing development, since the seventies 
they have also been significantly involved in urban renewal. This means that in the restructuring 
and rehabilitating of the early post-war housing districts, the subject of our analysis, the 
municipalities and the housing associations are two of the most important players. In addition, 
since the seventies it has become customary to involve residents and residents’ organizations in 
the preparation and implementation of urban renewal plans. 
 
Housing networks in two cities: the context for rehabilitating post-war housing districts 
As said before, the most important actors at the local level in housing policy are the local 
government, which can be divided into the offices of Housing and Environmental Planning, local 
politicians and housing associations. This can also be seen when the interactions of the various 
actors are mapped as has been done in scheme 1 and 21. Other actors that appear in the network 
are residents’ organizations, architects, construction companies and real estate agencies.  
Mapping the interactions between actors has been done by Multi Dimensional Scaling. This is a 
                     
1 The adequacy of the figures is expressed in the stress of the 
configuration. A low stress means that the distances in the 
figure give a good indication of the interaction patterns that 
have been found. The stress of both figures is low (first 
figure .16296 and the second figure .12340). 
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technique often used (Scott, 1991) in which distances are calculated between actors on the basis 
of interaction matrices that contain information concerning the interactions of each actor 
combined with all the other actors that have been examined. This complex diagram is presented 
in two dimensions, in which actors with the same pattern of interactions find themselves close to 
each other.2   
Looking at the schemes we see that in Rotterdam basically three clusters occur. The first cluster 
of actors at the right of the figure contains mainly housing associations, sub-municipal 
governments and some departments of the office of City Planning and Housing. This first cluster 
also includes the city alderman and several politicians. In the second cluster are most of the 
residents’ organizations and some other departments of City Planing and Housing. The 
departments here are more decentralized than those in the first cluster. Compared to the actors in 
the first cluster, these actors have less frequent contact with other actors and a less varied 
interaction pattern. The third cluster mainly consists of commercial actors (construction 
companies, real estate agencies and project developers). When compared with the actors in the 
other clusters these generally have little interaction with other actors. 
                     
2 Note that the computer calculates the dimensions, which are 
in fact distances between various actors.  
 Figure 1 Patterns of contact in Rotterdam (1994) 
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Dimension 1 
 A=architect, B=residents organization, C=housing associations, D=civil service department, F=construction company,  
G=sub-municipalities, M=real estate agency/developer,  O=organization of small firms, P=political party, W=city alderman, X=research 
organization 
 
 Figure 2 Patterns of contact in The Hague (1994) 
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A=architect, B=residents organization, C=housing associations, D=civil service department, M=real estate agency/developers, O=organization of 
small firms, P=political party, W=city alderman, X=researchorganization 
 
In the case of The Hague we see two clusters of actors. The left cluster consists of residents’ 
organizations and politicians. The actors in this cluster do not have a wide variety of contacts or a 
high frequency of interactions when compared to the other cluster.  That cluster contains the 
‘professional’ actors such as housing associations, project developers, departments of the office 
of Environmental Planning and Policy and of the office of Housing. Generally speaking, all these 
actors have many contacts with each other and their interactions are rather varied. 
Both networks can be described as tightly integrated. Most actors interact frequently with each 
other and recognize each other as important (Klijn, 1996: 136-138). Despite differences between 
the two networks their main features are the same. In both cases the heart of the network consists 
of actors that are deeply involved in social housing: housing associations and local civil service 
departments (mostly those involved in housing policy, environmental planning or land use). In 
addition to these two groups of actors, the city alderman and sometimes a project developer are 
part of the ‘core’ of the network.   
The networks also show some differences. Residents’ organizations are better integrated in the 
Rotterdam network than in that of The Hague where they have a peripheral position. Politicians 
in the network in The Hague are more peripheral than in the Rotterdam network. 
 
Post-war housing in two cities: complex policy processes 
In many large cities there is a large stock of dwellings that was built between 1945 and 1960. 
The buildings are mostly four-storey walk-ups and are almost exclusively owned and managed 
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by housing associations. The units are rather small (usually no more than 60 square meters), not 
very luxurious and most are in need of repair. Because of these problems a strong migration 
movement began in the seventies. Tenants with higher incomes moved out and were replaced by 
those with lower incomes. Due to the low rents the dwellings are still in demand, but now by 
different groups. In the beginning of the eighties discussions about these neighborhoods started 
within local networks. Tenants demanded maintenance and improvements. The housing 
associations started to upgrade the dwellings with outside repairs and insulation, and they 
installed new kitchens, toilets etc. This fit into the urban renewal approach practiced since the 
beginning of the seventies. With subsidies from the central government large numbers of post-
war dwellings were renovated for the current occupants.   
Most of the tenants are satisfied with this improvement strategy. Important for them is that, 
because the improvements are limited, the increase in rent is not too high. The housing 
associations, however, are less satisfied. They see that the improvement strategy does not affect 
the housing market position of the dwellings: the units remain very small and only in demand by 
low income groups. They claim that in this way segregation in the neighborhoods is reinforced.  
 
Rehabilitating  of the housing stock in Overschie: 1984-1990 
Overschie is a neighborhood of Rotterdam containing about 3,000 dwellings. Of these, more than 
1,000 are from the period 1945-1960, owned by the Rotterdam Municipal Housing Association 
(GWR). Many of the remaining 2,000 dwellings are of pre-war housing stock. The problems 
described above are very visible in the 1,000 post-war dwellings and residents have tried to 
convince local government and the GWR to improve them. In 1984 the GWR launched a 
maintenance and improvement program, but because of serious financial problems within the 
GWR the city council ordered the improvements stopped in 1985 (at that time the GWR was a 
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department of the local government; it has since been privatized). 
The city alderman decided that a project group would make an improvement plan that would also 
include a sound financial investment strategy. The project group, which started in the second half 
of 1986, consisted of the various departments of the office of City Planning and Housing (of 
which Housing is the most important) and the GWR, residents’ organizations and the sub-
municipality Overschie. During the decision-making process it became clear that various 
differences of opinion existed about the rehabilitation of the post-war housing stock in 
Overschie.  The Housing Department, a strong actor in renewal projects, supported an ambitious 
renovation plan. This was also supported by the residents and some other civil service 
departments. But the GWR did not agree. Compared to the subsidies available for pre-war 
rehabilitation, those for buildings constructed in the post-war period are very small, making a 
large renovation project very costly. Instead, the GWR wanted to demolish a significant part of 
the stock in order to build new dwellings that would have a better market position. The actors 
arrived at a deadlock. In an internal memorandum dated 11 November 1987, the then-district 
manager of the GWR in Overschie displayed his resignation about the decision-making process: 
‘We wonder whether all the time and effort which both you and we have put into this will lead to 
an acceptable policy plan for Overschie.’ This memo was written at the same time as a group 
was being put together to draft the policy plan. They were charged with ‘solving’ the differences 
in opinion between the actors and had to propose an integrated plan for Overschie. Strange is that 
the GWR, one of the most important actors involved, was not included in the policy drafting 
group. Despite the objections of the GWR the drafting group drew up a renewal plan that was 
presented at the beginning of 1988 and strongly focused on renovation.  The GWR did not accept 
the plan and refused to cooperate any longer. This invoked furious reactions from the other 
parties (especially residents’ organizations) and the city alderman decided to set up a special 
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project group with the top managers of all the organizations to develop a new plan that would be 
more financially solid. After some time this resulted, in the first half of 1989, in a plan that 
increased the number of dwellings to be demolished and in which the city government would 
provide some of the subsidies for dwellings to be renovated. This was acceptable to all parties 
and from then on the character of the interactions changed. Hostility no longer dominated and 
pragmatism took over, with interactions aimed at realizing the main features of the now accepted 
plan. 
 
An investment strategy for The Hague Southwest: 1991-1994  
In December 1993 the preliminary design of the Integrated Implementation Plan for The Hague 
Southwest was finally completed. This was part of an investment strategy that had been adopted 
by the city of The Hague in the summer of 1991. The intention was to achieve an integrated 
approach to The Hague Southwest by means of public-private cooperation.6 The most important 
planks of the investment strategy were an organizational structure responsible for the approach, a 
joint fund for financing property costs in order to balance cost-effective and non-cost-effective 
investments and an Integrated Implementation Plan.    
For the organizational structure a provisional body, the development company, was established 
in October 1991. This would become formalized and permanent in a later phase when the 
Integrated  Implementation Plan was completed.  The process got off to a slow start. The housing 
associations were not very enthusiastic about the plan and looked suspiciously at the two 
commercial actors that were drawn in by the city alderman.  It was only after the summer of 
1992 that enthusiasm gradually increased and serious talks started between the housing 
associations, commercial developers and departments of the local civil service. There had been a 
gradual change in perception by the housing associations.  They had become convinced that, 
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because of the reduction in subsidies from the central government for upgrading housing and the 
changing housing market, simple renovation was not enough to position the dwellings well in the 
housing market. 
The joint fund idea suffered an early demise. The housing associations were not willing to 
participate. The organizational structure never really got off the ground either, despite many 
efforts by the provisional development company to think of a form that would be acceptable for 
the different actors. The Implementation Plan had been worked on since the beginning of 1993. 
For more than seven months five housing associations, two commercial investors, various 
municipal departments and the chairman of the housing executive board had been negotiating 
about the action plan for the districts of Morgenstond, Moerwijk, Bouwlust and Vrederust, all of 
which had been built in the fifties. On 1 January the plan entered the public participation phase.  
Because the partners expected some opposition they kept the number of dwellings that would 
have to be demolished low. The plan also contained ideas for redesigning the public space in the 
neighborhoods.  
It rapidly became clear that there was indeed a good deal of opposition from the residents in 
Southwest. The parts of the plan dealing with demolition and new development proved 
particularly controversial. Before the total extent of the residents' opposition became entirely 
clear, however, the coalition split up. Two of the associations soon came up with alternative 
plans, and discussions about the allocation of sites stagnated. The municipal departments 
attempted to take over control of the process that had been in the hands of the provisional 
development company.  Following elections in 1994 the new chairman of the housing executive 
board decided that the city should take over supervision of the restructuring of Southwest. The 
provisional development company was dissolved. The Housing office’s action plan was finally 
adopted in December 1994 but bore only the most superficial resemblance to the Implementation 
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Plan presented a year earlier.  
 
 
4. THE RULES OF THE ROTTERDAM URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM 
 
One of the fascinating questions in the first case is why the Rotterdam Municipal Housing 
Association (GWR) accepted its exclusion from the policy drafting group when this was so 
important to its existence. An explanation cannot be found along rational strategy lines: rational 
strategy would predict that they would have participated and then objected to the improvement 
plans that were proposed. A more institutional analysis of the rules of the Rotterdam network is 
needed.  
The Rotterdam urban renewal program, in which renewal plans were made in project groups 
whose members included municipal departments, residents and (only eventually) housing 
associations, has virtually become a model for urban renewal in the Netherlands. Over time, a 
large number of ‘typical Rotterdam rules’ have cropped up elsewhere that have a regulating 
effect on the behavior of the participating actors. Reconstructing these rules is important in 
understanding the policy process that occurred in Overschie. In the following section the most 
distinctive rules are reconstructed. After this, the conduct of the GWR is set in the context of the 
Rotterdam social housing and urban renewal network rules.  
 
The association as subsidiary actor: position rules 
The Rotterdam urban renewal program is characterized by a large number of rules. These are 
explicit and professional rules that establish quality standards for a good urban renewal project, 
and were specifically developed by a department of the municipal office for City Planning and 
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Housing (DROS). There is a strong emphasis on technical quality (floor plans of the dwellings, 
price/quality ratios, etc.). But there are also clear rules with regard to the position of the actors. In 
the Rotterdam urban renewal program the various departments of the DROS, in particular the 
Housing Department (VH), played a prominent role. At the start of the urban renewal program, 
residents' organizations were in a strong position but the housing associations were subsidiary, 
particularly early on. As someone involved at the time described it: 
 The Housing Department was of course in an extremely strong position, not only 
compared to the GWR but compared to all the associations. The Housing Department 
was top dog; if it wasn't their idea then it wasn't any good.  
 
Another unwritten rule in Rotterdam underpins the strong position of the Housing Department: 
the more you pay, the more you can say. And since the Housing Department is a big contributor 
(via subsidies for improvements and new housing development) it can dictate the process. It was 
precisely these position rules that ensured that the GWR in Overschie would accept their 
exclusion from any further decision making. The restructuring of Overschie, from 1986 onwards, 
took place (at the beginning in any event) entirely within the rules that had been developed over 
ten years of urban renewal in Rotterdam.  
 
The ‘profile’ of the Rotterdam urban renewal program: product and identity rules 
The Rotterdam urban renewal program has its own very special ‘profile’, according to those 
involved. There is not only an emphasis on professional norms, mentioned above, but also a 
number of specific interaction rules and rules that regulate the actors' situations. 
Various interaction rules are more or less formally laid down. This applies, for example, to the 
composition and working methods of the urban renewal project groups and to a number of 
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conflict settlement mechanisms. An important formal interaction rule is that, in the case of 
conflicts occurring in the project group or between the project group and the departments, the 
council committee will arbitrate. Incidentally, this interaction rule also reinforces the subsidiary 
role of the landlord. As a housing association staff member laconically expressed it:  
 In the political culture of urban renewal at that time [the seventies and eighties], if a 
project group said something, we [=landlord] always did it, otherwise we would get into 
an argument, they would take it to the town hall in the Coolsingel and we would always 
lose the case. 
 
In addition, the parties involved derive their identity from a strong emphasis on pragmatism. It is 
not only about achieving good quality and affordable housing but also a kind of ‘shoulder to the 
wheel’ attitude. Within the Rotterdam social housing network there is great stress laid on the fact 
that at the end of the day decisions have to be made: 
 Here in Rotterdam we've always been like this: have a bit of an argument and then roll 
up our sleeves and get down to work again.  
 
Conflicts and compromises in the Rotterdam urban renewal program 
Avoiding conflict is not an issue in the Rotterdam urban renewal program. There is a tendency, 
in fact, to face conflicts head on and fight them out to the bitter end. The various council 
department employees identify strongly with their project group and the neighborhood. This 
means that conflicts can arise between the project group and the Planning Department (DROS). 
In the urban renewal program ‘every project is fought for hard and in every possible way’. 
On the other hand, these conflicts are tempered by an attitude of ‘working things out together’. 
This attitude of course ties in very well with the ‘roll up your sleeves’ rule mentioned above:  
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 In the Rotterdam tradition we've always argued in public, made choices and decisions 
based on solid arguments, and after that gone and had a pint together at the pub. 
 
Striving to reach consensus and working it out together depend in turn on the rules described 
regarding the quality of products and the identity of the Rotterdam urban renewal program. This 
means there are not only fixed standards for evaluating outcomes but there is also a certain 
mutual respect and recognition of each other's positions and contributions that underpin the 
interaction rule ‘working it out together’:  
There is a certain amount of recognition from parties towards each other. They 
recognize that the other is very knowledgeable, that they're carrying the risks, so they 
can obviously be trusted. 
 
If after a lengthy battle, however, a decision is finally forced in the project group, then everyone 
complies with that decision: 
Everyone tries to boost their own position and they make a lot of noise about it, but in the 
end no one quibbles about the final results. Everyone puts up with the fact that an 
acceptable compromise has been reached. 
 
Overschie and the urban renewal rules 
Right from the start it was acknowledged in the policy papers concerning the housing stock in 
Rotterdam that the approach in Overschie would be different for post-war than for pre-war 
housing. In addition, it was taken for granted that the existing network rules for the urban 
renewal program would be adopted, certainly to start with. Not only the positions of those 
involved in urban renewal but also the strict quality standards for renovation and procedures 
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were copied almost verbatim (Klijn, 1996).  
Similarly, the Overschie policy plan that appeared in 1988 strongly resembled the older urban 
renewal program. A respondent described the Overschie plan as:  
A typical traditional urban renewal plan involving large-scale renovation and keeping 
rents as low as possible. 
 
Since the subsidy regulations for post-war dwellings were considerably less favorable than for 
pre-war housing, the GWR ended up with a huge deficit.  
The central department of the GWR was now supervising the Overschie district, however, and 
they countered with a policy document in which they launched plans for increased demolition of 
dwellings. This led to severe criticism from the other parties involved: the residents' 
organizations and municipal departments. This was partly due to the fact that the GWR had not 
only broken the urban renewal rules regarding the (subsidiary) position of the landlord but also 
the rule stating that decisions made by the project group are sacred. This explicit breaking of the 
rules did not lead to any sanctions, however. The chairman of the housing executive board did 
not take sides on the policy plan issue but forced the municipal departments (the GWR was part 
of the municipality at the time) to work it out together. This resulted in a new plan in which more 
demolition was anticipated. This was the last time that the landlord allowed himself to be shoved 
aside. From this point on, the rules of the Rotterdam urban renewal program were no longer 
sacred. Very gradually new interaction rules were developed and old rules were interpreted in 
new ways (Klijn, 1996).  
The decision making surrounding Overschie illustrates how a policy process initially develops 
entirely in accordance with conventional network rules. Only the fact that these rules were so 
strongly adhered to by those involved can explain why the GWR initially allowed itself to be 
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excluded from the decision-making process. It was only when those rules were explicitly and 
emphatically broken, a move which was not officially sanctioned, that the decision-making 
process was given a different twist. Only then did the GWR once more become a full-scale 
player in the game. The Overschie case displays two characteristic features of rules. First of all, 
they are taken for granted and very strong as long as they are not called into question. Secondly, 
rules can be changed.  
 
 
5. NETWORK RULES IN THE HAGUE 
 
The events surrounding the investment strategy in The Hague Southwest cannot be understood 
without knowledge of The Hague’s social housing network. Just as the Rotterdam social housing 
and urban renewal network has a number of striking features, so does that in The Hague. In 
comparison to the network rules in Rotterdam, it is the position rules in The Hague that 
particularly stand out. These strongly emphasize the autonomy of the actors. The interaction 
rules, in which conflict is an important factor, fit in with this to a great extent. 
 
Autonomy of actors: the position rules in The Hague network 
The position rules in The Hague social housing network in the late eighties and early nineties 
were dominated by a tradition of stressing organizational autonomy vis-à-vis other actors, and 
strongly emphasizing organizational interests and choices. It was not only the two important 
municipal offices, the Construction and Housing Department and the Environmental Planning 
and Economic Development Department (REO)7, that tried to delineate their own territory. The 
housing associations tried to do this, too, both vis-à-vis each other and in relation to the 
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municipality and other parties. 
 They are interfering in things that we feel are our business and vice-versa. (municipal 
employee commenting on the positions of the Construction and Housing Department and 
the REO) 
 
 We own nearly all the dwellings; we also have the power to decide what will happen to 
them. 
 
Actors kept an eye on each other while trying to create a good image for themselves. This 
applied particularly to Hague political circles, which have a reputation as far as the image-
building of the various executive board chairmen is concerned and the conflicts involved. The 
stress on organizational autonomy also led to an emphasis on an organization's veto power: the 
capacity to block decisions or the ability to sway the decision-making process.  
A proposal will never get to the municipal council without the REO and Construction 
and Housing Departments being involved. (a council employee) 
 
 The chairmen of the municipal executive board want a lot of attention in such a large 
district. We're talking about over 30,000 homes, that’s a lot of voters. IIt…] was 
definitely an underlying factor and the main problem was that the departments 
absolutely refused to give an inch. (respondent talking about the situation at the start of 
the restructuring of Southwest in 1985) 
 
Emphasizing organizational autonomy and interests in this way quickly led to tensions and 
political and administrative wrangling. This applied both to the relations between the two 
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departments that were intensively involved in urban renewal and housing improvement at the 
time of the investment strategy – the Construction and Housing Department and the 
Environmental and Economic Development Department (REO) – as well as to the city and the 
housing associations. 
 So we are in the middle of a rivalry between the Construction and Housing Department 
and the REO. The Construction and Housing Department is seen as Dijkhuizen's 
department [Chairman of the Housing Executive Board] and the REO as Noordanus' 
department [Chairman of the Environmental Planning and Urban Renewal Executive 
Board]. (council employee talking about the period of the investment strategy) 
 
 Relations between the city and the housing associations are extremely tense.  
 
Product and identity rules: an identity crisis? 
Just as in Rotterdam, the actors in The Hague network shared a number of rules about the 
product they were providing and the rules that determined the identities of the actors. Generally 
speaking, there was a high degree of similarity in the rules displayed in both networks. In The 
Hague network, demolition had become a dirty word, almost taboo. It also evoked intense 
discussions. Efforts to limit demolition as far as possible strongly influenced the planning for 
The Hague Southwest in the period between 1984-1994.  
 Large-scale demolition was absolutely out of the question, it almost amounted to 
sacrilege. (respondent talking about the situation during the early years of the 
restructuring in Southwest) 
 
Other important product rules were the emphasis on low rents, renovation and the provision of 
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social housing. These only began to shift slightly in the early nineties, mainly as a result of the 
identity rules of the associations. 
The identity of the actors in the social housing network was closely linked with concern for 
lower income groups and management of the cheap housing stock. These identity rules in turn 
influenced what was considered the ideal desired product: a relatively good dwelling for a low 
price. Incidentally, these rules were most strongly represented in the housing associations, the 
residents' organizations and the Construction and Housing Department. In addition, they also had 
a highly regulating influence on many political parties. 
In the nineties, the strong emphasis on low rents began to diminish in importance. Both for the 
housing associations and the municipal departments this rule was no longer ‘sacred’. These 
changes were connected with the changes in financing for social housing, which led to different 
reward rules. To oversimplify somewhat: low rents and optimal use of the subsidy options were 
no longer the product standards for housing, but had now been replaced by future value, 
rentability and cost-effective commercial options. When the restructuring of Southwest began, 
most investment risks were still covered by the central government. During the eighties and early 
nineties the subsidies for social housing decreased and the financial risks of housing 
improvement and construction were shifted increasingly to the housing associations. It was the 
cost-effectiveness of the investments that took on an increasingly key role.  
 We're always willing to fund a cost-effective investment, the question is: is it cost-
effective?  
 
This also promoted the development of a new identity for the housing associations in which they 
no longer saw themselves as almost exclusively working for the lower income groups. 
I must say, at that time [early days of the restructuring of Southwest] we were strongly oriented 
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towards the tenants who were given plenty of opportunity to participate in the 
organization through general meetings and residents' associations... Now our thinking 
has really professionalized. In the beginning everyone was really proud of the fact that 
our tenants were primarily people who had no earned income – seven out of ten fall into 
that category. In the last few years we have come to see this as one of our weak points. 
(housing association employee) 
 
Interaction rules: laborious interaction and changing rules 
Generally speaking, entry to the games in The Hague network was reserved for actors involved 
in social housing. It was more or less taken for granted that the actors involved in programs and 
projects concerning the existing housing stock would primarily be from the housing associations 
and the municipality. This entry rule was less strict here than in some other cities, for example 
Rotterdam. 
Until the early nineties the housing associations had a very clear game rule for the equal division 
of new housing development and new locations.8 This rule ensured that serious conflicts would 
be avoided and it was possible to present a reasonably united front to the municipality. Since the 
mid-nineties, however, this rule has been almost totally abandoned because it was unable to 
withstand the changing situation in social housing. Furthermore, it was not underpinned by any 
solidarity among the housing associations. As has already been shown, the housing associations 
were more concerned with their own autonomy than with cooperation.  
 We have shoved away all the rules. There was this rule that everyone should build in 
their own area and more or less in the same style 
. 
 At that time in the city the areas were still neatly sectioned off. The urban renewal areas 
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were allocated, and that was where the bulk of the new housing development took place. 
 
The interaction rules were characterized by strong non-intervention rules, which was not 
surprising in view of the arena rules with their emphasis on organizational autonomy and 
interests. Housing associations did not get involved with each other's property and had little need 
for coordinating their plans. In The Hague there is minimal provision of information; some 
respondents indicated that withholding information might even be typical of The Hague 
mentality. Actors thus knew little about each other (with the exception of the housing 
associations, which on the whole did inform each other of plans that might affect each other’s 
properties). 
 Withholding information is a bit of a municipal tradition in The Hague.  
 
 [At a housing association conference in Rotterdam] it was actually the first time that the 
plans had been laid out all together on the table. It has never been the custom, and it still 
isn't, to discuss them with each other. (housing association employee talking about the 
exchange of information between housing associations) 
 
An important interaction rule mentioned by a lot of respondents was The Hague politicians' 
tendency to postpone decisions. There existed in The Hague what a large number of respondents 
described as a ‘compromise culture’. This is generally meant in a negative sense, i.e. that no clear 
decisions get made.  
 The role politicians play is far too vague. Committee chairmen have done their 
homework on the whole, but really sticking their necks out about concrete decisions, 
saying now this is what we're going to do, this is totally absent in The Hague. 
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 We've been disappointed so many times. The committee chairmen and city council are so 
ambivalent about taking the initiative, they say they're in favor in principle, but as soon 
as a demolition decree comes up in council they vote against it. So I haven't got a whole 
lot of faith in them. 
 
In a situation in which rules are typified by an emphasis on organizational autonomy and 
interests, and there is considerable political and administrative rivalry, forms of interaction will 
soon arise in which the key elements are the feasibility of projects and the avoidance of big 
conflicts. Many respondents emphasized the fact that feasibility and a realistic sense of 
possibilities were central issues in the planning.  
 
 Everyone wants a feasible plan. 
 
 The feasibility of the plan was extremely important. 
 
In the early and mid-nineties, compelled partly by the changes in the non-profit housing sector, a 
number of interaction rules in The Hague network changed, especially those that emphasized 
proportional distribution. The rules of autonomy and organizational interests however remained. 
This explains the creation of stronger conflict patterns between housing associations. The 
potential conflicts, stemming from the emphasis on organizational autonomy, were previously 
kept in check by the rules of proportional distribution and the fact that the housing associations 
were very much involved with their own properties. 
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The Hague network rules and decision making about Southwest 
The Hague network rules had a great influence on decision making surrounding the restructuring 
of Southwest. First of all they were responsible to a large extent for the laborious interaction 
process in the run up to the expansion plan. The whole idea of the investment strategy assumed a 
fairly high degree of cooperation in which the actors concerned would surrender a part of their 
own autonomy. But this cooperation was obstructed, as we have shown above, by the existing 
arena and interaction rules operating in The Hague network. In view of these rules it is not 
surprising that proposals for an integrated organizational structure and for a joint fund for 
financing property costs in which autonomy would have to be sacrificed were soon scrapped. 
The ‘normal’ course of events in The Hague, in which each of the actors organized their own 
affairs, was also partly responsible for the fact that it took some time before actors actually 
interacted with each other about the main features of the plan. The decision making on the 
allocation of sites was also slow going. The existing principles of proportional distribution 
proved to be difficult to implement although the actors continued to cling to them. The expansion 
plan that appeared in December 1993 thus lacked solid support among the collaborating actors. 
Its development had been a highly laborious process and the various actors were not keen to 
commit themselves to it very strongly.9 In short, the Integrated Implementation Plan lacked solid 
support from the actors.  
The interaction patterns of conflict and the selection of strategies that would primarily further 
one’s own organizational interests cropped up repeatedly and at the slightest provocation. The 
stimulus in this case was the first serious criticism of the Implementation Plan. Furthermore, in 
early 1994 it became clear to a number of important parties, i.e. several housing associations, that 
they were to be allocated relatively few new development sites. This led to the rapid dissolution 
of the compromise that had been reached with such difficulty. The most important obstacles to 
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the investment strategy as it was launched by the city, however, were located in The Hague 
network rules and the interaction patterns that followed from those rules. The emphasis on 
organizational autonomy and conflict hampered the achieving of joint plans and, more 
importantly, the surrendering of powers. 
 
6. CONCLUSION: RULES AS CONTEXT FOR DECISION MAKING 
 
Each network is characterized by a specific set of rules. For example, the position rules in the 
Rotterdam network are not the same as those in The Hague network. At the same time empirical 
evidence shows that rules influence the decision making within networks. They create elements 
that are taken for granted such as occurred in Overschie, or set up blockages to cooperation such 
as in the restructuring of The Hague Southwest. Rules thus form the context for the decision 
making within networks.   
 
Rules as infrastructure for complex decision-making processes 
Rules thus form the social infrastructure of a network. They are not only an element that is ‘taken 
for granted’ in the interactions but, as the above analysis makes clear, also provide actors with a 
handle for the interactions. For example, in Rotterdam, when conflicts arose about the 
restructuring of post-war districts in the period 1985-1995, rules from the earlier urban renewal 
process were automatically fallen back on despite the fact that there was no formal framework 
for urban renewal in this case (Klijn, 1996). Rules that have once been devised are thus used by 
the actors in other situations. In this sense network rules are highly important as structural 
preconditions for policy interactions in networks. They delimit interaction options but function at 
the same time as a sort of ‘option fund’ for the actors.  
  
 
 37
The ‘taken for granted’ aspect of rules can also be interpreted theoretically. Not only do rules 
arise in socialization processes as was demonstrated earlier, but they are also retained because 
they are ‘efficient’. (see e.g.: Ostrom, 1986; Burns/Flam, 1987; March/Olsen, 1989). Rules, and 
the routines they involve, survive because they form an alternative to time-consuming decision-
making processes. They provide existing agreements and choices that can be taken for granted 
thereby saving the effort of having to assess each decision in minute detail. In this way, rules can 
be an efficient way to deal with the transaction costs problem (Willamson, 1979). This 
‘efficiency’ aspect is also recognized by actors:  
We have tried as far as possible to work in the same way as in the urban renewal 
program, in other words with three parties, trying to force decisions as much as possible 
and striving for consensus. (housing association employee talking about the later 
restructuring in Rotterdam) 
 
Rules can also structure policy interactions to a great extent. The interactions surrounding the 
restructuring of The Hague Southwest illustrate this. In this network, game rules had arisen in 
which organizational autonomy was strongly emphasized. Together with a number of other 
important network rules, such as the emphasis on non-intervention and in the scant provision of 
information, a situation was created in which conflicts dominated. In this type of institutional 
context, each individual actor has a tendency to try to improve his own position first and 
foremost and to strive to maximize his own outcomes. Cooperation thus becomes very difficult 
unless all the actors collectively decide on it: the classic prisoners' dilemma (see Van der Doel, 
1978). This is extremely unlikely, however, owing to the rules of the network. A vicious circle is 
thus created: the rules promote non-cooperative behavior and conflicts in interactions, and these 
interactions in turn reproduce the existing rules. The potential advantages of cooperation have 
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little chance. Such ‘institutional barriers’ are not easy to break down (for the problem of 
dominant patterns in ecologies of games see also: Axelrod, 1984).  
 
Rules as precondition for success 
The fact that network rules affect interactions and influence the success of governance attempts 
is not so surprising if one considers that progress in decision making within networks is to a large 
extent a question of cooperation (Klijn, 1996a; Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997). As a 
consequence of the dependencies among actors, meaningful outcomes can only be achieved if 
coordination of interactions takes place. As we have seen above, network rules can promote the 
opportunities for this coordination in various ways but can also hinder them. Of course, care 
must be taken when making generalizations about rules such as preconditions for success in 
policy processes based on the findings of the cases discussed here. The following list comprises a 
number of provisional conclusions based on the empirical evidence:  
- strong rules to protect actors' autonomy hamper cooperation and interactions; 
- clear and accepted conflict regulating mechanisms promote cooperation and interactions; 
- cooperation is benefited by accepted product rules about quality and specifications of 
products and services that are relevant within the network. These furnish actors with 
more or less objective standards to use in negotiations on the content of policy 
processes10; 
- strong non-intervention rules obstruct interactions, or if interactions do get underway 
they promote conflicts. They form an obstacle to cooperation. Furthermore, they involve 
the risk of causing a certain rigidity of perceptions. 
 
Good rules for conflict management appear to provide a favorable climate for satisfactory 
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cooperation. Strong domain boundaries and an emphasis on organizational autonomy, on the 
other hand, obstruct cooperation. Accepted product rules promote cooperation because rapid 
agreement will be reached on the quality levels to be striven for. The downside is that this can 
create a certain rigidity in the decision making. This also applies to the existence of non-
intervention rules. Either they ensure that few interactions take place or they increase the chances 
of conflict in interactions. Both are unfavorable conditions for cooperation as The Hague case 
demonstrates. 
 
Changeability of rules 
Although rules appear to be an attractive concept in explaining the development and outcome of 
policy interactions in networks, reservations must be voiced regarding the manipulability of 
rules. As the case studies showed, rules are developed over time during interactions and it is rare 
for them to abruptly lose their validity. Changes in network rules come about very gradually. 
This is logical since rules generally change only when a substantial proportion of the actors no 
longer recognize them. 
The cases prompt another observation. Rules are not suddenly scrapped but rather gradually 
acquire a different interpretation. For example, existing rules may be used for new situations but 
are not tailored to that situation. The changes thus achieved can later be ‘taken for granted’ or 
even codified, and may be enriched with other rules developed during the interaction. For 
example, the rule in Rotterdam which stated ‘the more you pay, the more you can say’ was 
maintained but led to a change in the positions of municipal departments and housing 
associations. On the other hand, new product rules were developed such as those on the desired 
division between categories of rented accommodation (see Klijn, 1996, 160-162; 190-192). 
Rules do not change slowly only because the process has to undergo a reinterpretation. They also 
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change slowly because they are related to existing power relations. Changing the rules usually 
therefore means changing the balance of power. For example, the product rules from the 
Rotterdam urban renewal program, in which ‘high level renovation’ is the norm, are the result of 
a power situation from the seventies: a coalition of residents' organizations, municipal 
departments and (social democratic) politicians. A change in those product rules, towards less 
renovation, more demolition and new housing development, is directly linked to the shifting 
power relations in social housing. On the one hand rules are a source of power. They regulate 
which problems are acceptable and which are not, which actors gain entry and what their 
position is. At the same time, they are an expression of the balance of power from the past and 
change – usually after some delay – along with those shifting power relations. These processes 
usually tend to be accompanied by conflicts and obstacles.  Public management has to take this 
into account. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. This does not alter the fact that formal and informal rules often cannot be easily separated 
from each other, and that they influence each other. This can also be seen in the empirical 
analysis that follows. Not only are informal rules often somehow linked with formal 
rules, such as the standards used for renovation in the urban renewal program discussed 
later, but they are also influenced by what might be termed ‘the shadow of formal 
rulemaking’ (see the example of the council's arbitration in the Rotterdam urban renewal 
program discussed later). 
2. Within the institutional perspective, Scott (1995) distinguishes a regulative, a normative 
and a cognitive perspective on institutions and rules. He also observes that, generally 
speaking, a shift can be perceived in which the latter perspective increases in meaning 
(Scott, 1995: XV). The perspective used here ties in best with Scott's cognitive 
perspective, although elements from the other perspectives can also be identified. 
3. There is a rich source of information that can be used to determine the characteristics of 
rule-guided behavior, however most of this does not come from public administration. 
The most important are: van Gunsteren, 1976; Duinther, 1977; Giddens, 1984, Ostrom, 
1986; Burns/Flam, 1987; Cohen, 1989; Scott, 1995.  
  
 
  
4. The comparison of social rules with, e.g., chess rules is thus not entirely correct. Chess 
rules specify the meaning, and also the permissibility, of the moves, but these cannot be 
changed during the game. Rules in a network, on the other hand, can be changed, 
although these changes will take place gradually over the course of a sequence of games. 
This is why the concept of games as it is used here cannot automatically be equated with 
the concept of games such as chess or football.  
5. There is a relationship between the distinction used here between arena rules and 
interaction rules and the distinction frequently used in the literature between constitutive 
rules and modifying rules (see, e.g., Duintjer, 1977: 45-48). I agree with Duintjer (47), 
however, when he argues that constitutive rules not only create new behavioral 
possibilities, they also restrict behavior. It is not the case, therefore, that this is the sole 
distinguishing element between the two types of rules. 
6. And if empirical evidence is found one often observes a rather loose link between the 
theoretical framework and the empirical material (see Burns/Flam, 1987). 
7. Incidentally, the two departments were merged in 1995. The ‘power struggle’ between 
them was certainly one of the reasons for the amalgamation. 
8. The classic pacification rules can be discerned here: autonomy and proportion (Lijphart, 
1992) 
9. It is significant that in its end phase the part of the plan in which the new view in this 
field was developed was named after the architect who was commissioned to develop the 
plan by the actors involved. This suggests that it was the architect's plan and not that of 
the participating actors, who could thus protect themselves against criticism and remain 
free agents. 
10. This finding displays some affinity with ideas from the negotiation literature (see, e.g., 
Ury/Fisher, 1981 with their emphasis on seeking objective criteria). 
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